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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Marital Deduction Terminable Interests -
Federal Estate Tax Hazards
The bequest to surviving spouse, commonly known as the marital de-
duction,' is presently the most important tax-saving feature in the field of
federal estate tax planning.2 Substantial tax savings are available to the
decedent's estate through judicious employment of he marital deduction.
These could ultimately accrue to the benefit of the beneficiaries of the es-
tate.' However, the tax benefit may be lost because of the complexity
of the statute and the strict construction given these provisions by the
courts.4 A majority of the difficulties arise out of the terminable interest
rule.5 The central idea behind the complex provisions of the terminable
interest rule are noted at the outset. If the dead hand of the testator at-
tempts to exert control over the property given to the spouse, the deduction
vwill be denied. The gift to the spouse must either be outright or without
strings attached, except as permitted by the statute.6 If this test is not met,
the bequest fails with resulting tax liability to the decedent's estate.
Because each estate has its own challenge in minimizing the tax im-
pact, this note will analyze present tax hazards to the individual estate
plan or will which employs the marital deduction.
THE MAITAL DEDuCrIoN
The marital deduction is, in the vernacular, an example of an eight-
state tail wagging a forty-state dog.7 Prior to 1948, a surviving spouse
1. INT. REv. CODE oF 1954 5 2056 [hereinafter ated as CODE S].
2. See generally 1 BowE, EsTATE PLANNmG & TAXATION S 2.1, at 57-58 (1957); Glass-
moyer, The Terminable Interest and the Marital Deductson, N.Y.U. 14TH INST. ON FED. TAX
393 (1956).
3. LowNDEs & KRAmt, FEDERAL ESTATE & GIFT TAXES S 17.1, at 370 (2d ed. 1962).
4. Ibid; see also Sugarman, Estate and Gift Tax Equalization - The Marital Deduction Rule,
36 CALIF. L REV. 223 (1948).
5. CODE 5 2056(b) (1) "Where, on the lapse of time, on the occurrence of an event or
contingency, or on the failure of an event or contingency to occur, an interest passing to the
surviving spouse will terminate or fail, no deduction shall be allowed under this section with
respect to such interest -
(A) if an interest in such property passes or has passed (for less than adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth) from the decedent to any person other than
such surviving spouse (or the estate of such spouse); and
(B) if by reason of such passing such person (or his heirs or assigns) may possess or
enjoy any part of such property after such termination or failure of the interest so passing to
the surviving spouse; and no deduction shall be allowed with respect to such interest (even if
such deduction is not disallowed under subparagraphs (A) and (B)) -
(C) if such interest is to be acquired for the surviving spouse pursuant to directions of
the decedent, by hs executor or by the trustees of a trust.
6. CODE §5 2056(b) (3), (5)-(6)
7 Congress has been criticized for making the vast majority of citizens in common law states
adopt themselves to a community property rule through the tax statute. Paul, Erosion of the
Tax Base and Rate Structure, 11 TAX L REV. 203, 217 (1956); see Surrey, Federal Taxation
of the Family - The Revenue Act of 1948, 61 HARV. L. REv. 1097, 1117-18 (1948)
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in a community property state' had a distinct tax advantage over a fel-
low atizen in a common law state.' For example, a Texas spouse's estate
paid $4,800 in taxes on a $200,000 estate, while an equivalent New
York estate suffered a $31,500 estate tax."0  To correct this in-
equality, the marital deduction" was enacted by Congress in 1948 to
provide equal tax treatment, regardless of domicile.' It allows the taxa-
tion of one half of the adjusted gross estate to be treated as though it
were the wife's property, thereby escaping the Immediate tax impact.
Advantages of the Marital Deduction
Deferment of taxation of one half of the husband's estate until the
death of his wife can accrue very substantial federal tax savings. Each
estate has a $60,000 individual exemption 3 base, and the tax rates are
lower for two halves,1" each half taking advantage of the low initial
rates. 5 Moreover, the wife can make substantial, non-tax gifts during
her life; the estate can grow, in which case the survivors will benefit from
the use of the capital; and, the need for cash liquidations at death of hus-
band is drastically reduced. However, while the tax advantage appears
obvious, there are numerous difficulties which make the marital de-
duction an unwise option in specific estate plans.'"
8. The eight community property states are Arizona, California, Lousmna, Idaho, New
Mexico, Nevada, Texas, and Washington. BuRBY, REAL PROPE3RTY 348 n.1 (2d ed. 1954).
Oklahoma in 1939 and in 1945 enacted community property laws to give its ctizens the bene-
fit of the federal tax laws. Okla. Sess. Laws 1939, ch. 62, art. 2 §§ 1, 6, at 356-57, Commis-
sioner v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44 (1944); Okla. Sess. Laws 1945, tt. 32, ch. 1, § 3, at 118.
The community property law was subsequently repealed after passage of the 1948 amendments
to the federal income and estate tax laws. Okla. Sess. Laws 1949, tit. 32, ch. 1, §5 1, 2, at 229.
9. LOWNDES & KRAMER, op. cit. supra note 3, at § 17-1; Anderson, The Marital Deduction
and Equalization Under The Federal Estate and Gift Taxes Between Common Law and Com-
munity Property States, 54 McH. L REv. 1087 (1956).
10. 1 BOWB, op. cit. supra note 2, at S 2.2.
11. The technical title is Bequest to Surviving Spouse, CODE § 2056 (formerly Int. Rev.
Code of 1939 § 812(e), 62 Stat. 110 (1948)).
12. S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 285, 303-06, 332 (1948), in 1948-1 CUM.
BULL. 285; see Surrey, supra note 7; see generally for an analysis of the legislative history,
Note, The Marital Deduction in Federal Estate Tax: The Terminable Interest Rule, 107 U. PA.
L REV. 1176 (1959), in 4 TAx COuaNsELoRs Q. 467 (1960); see generally DeWind, The
Approaching Crisis in Federal Estate and Gift Taxation, 38 CALIF. L. REV. 79 (1950).
13. CODE 5 2052.
14. Assume the husband gives one-half of his estate to his wife, the other half to other
survivors.
15. For example, a $200,000 estate of which one-half goes to the wife, one-half to the chil-
dren, the husband's estate would pay $4,800 tax. If the wife gave all of her share to the
children on her death, she would also pay $4,800 tax. However, if the husband attempted to
pass the entire estate to the children on his death, or give the wife a life estate, remainder to
the children, the tax would be $32,700. Thus, the marital deduction tax saving would be
$23,100. See CODE § 2001; but see note 22 infra for complications due to state inheritance
taxes, administration expenses, etc.
16. LOWND13S & KRAMER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 370.
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Disadvantages of the Martal Deduction
Numerous ordinary tax dollar disadvantages may beset the estate
planner in using the marital deduction. Thus, the half of the estate
bequeathed to the wife will be subject to a second state inheritance or
estate tax because most states do not allow a marital deduction."
Moreover, the cost of administration of the estate on the death of the
wife may amount to five to ten percent of the estate. Double state in-
heritance taxes and administration costs alone can be a decisive factor
against the use of the marital deduction. Also, the marital deduction may
be unattractive where the expected surviving spouse independently has
a large estate. Moreover, other planning devices such as the annuity
or life insurance' 8 may be superior alternative methods to pass tax-free
property to the survivors.
Aside from the straight dollar-value factors involved in estate plan-
ning, the marital deduction statute and regulations covering the trans.
fer of a property interest which may fail or terminate are treacherous.
Thus, the most important initial question to resolve may be the objective
of the potential testator.
OBJECTIVES OF TESTATOR
Of foremost Importance to a person with a large estate is the desire
to pass his accumulated wealth on to his family or survivors with a
minimum of tax erosion.'" This desire, however, may be foiled by the
federal tax laws which attempt to extract the maximum legally allowable
tax from each testamentary transfer. Therefore, careful planning is the
broad, motivating objective of the taxpayer. Unfortunately, however,
the testator is seldom willing to follow the simple mandate of the marital
deduction statute which directs that one-half of the husband's estate go to
the wife with no strings attached.2 ' Therein lies the complexity; the hus-
band simply refuses to let his property go. Accordingly, by his will he
creates restrictions or conditions which potentially bring the bequest with-
in the penumbra of the terminable interest rule.2'
17 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 5731.09 ($10,000 exemption); § 5731.12 (lower tax rates
for spouses succession) But, there is no credit or provision for successive taxable transfers.
29 OHio JuR. 2d Inheritance & Estate Taxes § 49, at 50 (1958) Cf. CODE § 2013 (credit
for taxes on transfers up to 10 years prior).
18. CODE §§ 2039, 2042; see generally 1 BOWE, op. cit. supra note 2, at § 2.20.
19. See Scharfy, Problems Relating to: Marital Deducton Considerations, 13 W REs. L.
REV. 346, 352 (1962); Eisenstein, The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax, 11 TAX L. REV.
223 (1956).
20. Commissioner v. Estate of Ellis, 252 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1958); Estate of Pipe v. Com-
missioner, 241 F.2d 210, 214 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U. S. 814 (1957) "lilt appears
that Congress looked to an absolute ownership of the surviving spouse in a commumty prop-
erty state as the test and that anything less should not be granted the deduction unless it comes
squarely within a strict construction of [an exception to the terminable interest rule)." Com-
missioner v. Estate of Ellis, supra at 114.
21. In Estate of Michael Melamid, 22 T.C. 966 (1954), the estate paid a $91,000 tax de-
[VoL 16:190
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The considerations which motivate the propertied spouse may be as
follows:'
(1) the surviving wife may remarry and thereby either consume all
of the bequest or leave it to strangers to the decedent's family by gift or
will;
(2) the surviving spouse may be incapable or untrained in han-
dling large amounts of property;
(3) the testator may desire to retain a particular property or busi-
ness intact;
(4) the testator may dislike the uncertain identity of the ultimate
recipient of the property if the wife has full control over its disposition,
or he may fear the possibility of a stranger exerting undue influence over
the widow in the ultimate disposition of the property;
(5) the wife may have a tendency to dissipate the property, in which
case, the testator may attempt to restrict the wife's use or control over
property built up over a lifetime;
(6) the husband may fear that the wife will survive him for only
a short period and thereby unnecessarily impose excessive tax and ad-
ministration costs on the multiple transfers of the property.
On the other hand, the statute permits the husband to exercise some
direction over the property passing to the surviving wife by the pro-
visions for the life estate in property,2 a life income from a trust,"24 or
insurance and annuity contracts,25 as long as she alone has the power
of appointment over the remainder in all events. "
THE TERMINABLE INTEREST RULE
A husband's 7 bequest to his wife will fail or terminate for federal
estate tax purposes if: (1) the interest28 passing may not actually go to
ficiency because the husband had limited the wife's power to invade the corpus of the testa-
mentary trust for the support required to maintain her standard of living. This bequest failed
because it was a terminable interest.
22. See generally 2 CCH FED. EST. & GIFT TAX REP. 55 7001-7174 (1958); Polster, The
Use of Will Substitutes to Disinherit the Survwmng Spouse, 13 W RES. L. REV. 674 (1962).
23. CODE § 2056(b) (5).
24. Ibid.
25. CoDE 5 2056(b) (6).
26. See, e.g., Estate of Frank E. Tingley, 22 T.C. 402 (1954), aff4d sub. uom., Starrett v.
Commissioner, 223 F.2d 163 (1st Cir. 1955) (power of appointment to abate in the event
of wife's mental incapacity).
27. Throughout this note, the decedent's estate will be considered that of the husband, even
though the law is equally applicable to an estate of a wife who predeceases her husband.
28. Interest is used here in the broadest sense of property rights. 4 MERTENs, FEDERAL
GIFT & EsTATs TAXATiON § 29.22 (1959); see generally Treasury Reg. § 20.2056(b)-
1(e) (2) (1958) [hereinafter cited as Reg. f]. Interest in property refers to the extent of
ownership by the surviving spouse or other person, of particular property. S. REP. No. 1013,
pt. 2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-13, in 1948-1 CUM. BULL. 331, 332-40. The term property is
used in a comprehensive sense and includes all objects or rights which are susceptible of
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the wife,29 or (2) if any other person may enjoy the property on failure
or termination,30 or (3) if such interest goes to the husband's executor
or a trustee for the benefit of the wife without her control. 31 However,
a terminable interest such as a bond, note, patent, or copyright which may
expire during the life of the wife, or an interest which she has received
by payment of full consideration qualifies as a deduction. 2
The objective of the general rule on terminable interests is clear- to
insure that property passing to the wife free of an estate tax will be taxed
either at her demise or by an inter vivos transfer tax.
Interest on Unidentified Assets
While the terminable interest rule may appear to be an all-or-noth-
ing risk, its most direct mechanical reduction of deductible assets occurs
as to an asset which by its nature has a terminable existence.
If a bequest to the wife is based on a formula or percentage of the
adjusted gross estate' which includes a terminable interest, the marital
deduction is reduced by the amount of such asset in the estate.34 A com-
mon example of such an asset is rent for a term of years. More impor-
tandy, however, are the following three exceptions within the statute.
Interests Passing Conditioned on Surwval of Spouse
A bequest to the wife which is conditioned on the wife surviving the
husband by not more than six months will not terminate and thereby lose
its status as a deduction; however, the wife's death within the six months,
or as a result of a common disaster, must not actually occur.3 5 This pro-
vision is an exception to the general rule on terminable interests because
it allows the husband to place a minimum survivorship condition on the
passing of his property to his wife. But, this exception is dearly limited
to the contingency provision. If the wife dies within six months after
ownership. lbud. See, e.g., Estate of Cunha v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1960);
Estate of Pipe v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 210 (2d Cir. 1957).
29. CoDE 5 2056(b) (1) (A).
30. CODE § 2056(b) (1) (B).
31. CODE § 2056(b) (1) (C); see generally 1 BOWE, op. cit. supra note 2, at § 2.10.
32. CODE 5 2056(b) (1) In Estate of Nelson v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 720 (5th Cir.
1956), where the spouses were joint operators of a 55 acre Florida citrus farm and the hus-
band conveyed the land to his wife and self as tenants in the entirety, the court avoided the
terminable interest rule which rested on the invalidity of the conveyance for lack of valid
consideration by recognition of the wife's past services "and other consideration" as sustaining
the transfer under state law.
33. Presently most estates take full advantage of the marital deduction by giving the wife
50% of the adjusted gross estate. It is called the formula method, because the will-drafter
has no way of forecasting the actual pecuniary value of the estate on valuation date. See
generally LOWNiES & KRAMER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 371. Such a method can lead to
strange results and undesirable property and tax consequences. Matter of Gilmour, 18 App.
Div. 2d 154, 238 N.Y.S. 2d 624 (1953) ($518,000 to the wife, $99,000 to the children).
34. Reg. S 20.2056(b)-2 (1958).
35. CODE § 2056(b) (3), Kasper v. Kellar, 217 F.2d 744 (8th Cir. 1954)
[VoL 16:190
Marital Dedaction Termwable Interests
the husband's death, and the event is a condition to the passing of the
interest to the wife, the interest is terminable and the husband's estate
does not obtain the benefit of the marital deduction36 because nothing has
vested in the wife.
Power of Appointment Over the Remainder
Another exception to the central mandate of the terminable interest
rule is the creation of a life estate in the wife together with the power of
appointment over the remainder in the wife." Although the general
thrust of the statute is to force the husband to give the property outright
to the wife, this exception permits the husband to give the wife a life
estate; however, the wife alone, either by an inter vivos transfer or by
her will must have the power to appoint the remainder in all events and
without restriction. To this extent, the statute permits a deviation from
the Congressional objective of uniform tax treatment in all states.3" The
interest bequeathed to the wife may be an outright gift of the property
or a grant in trust."o
Life Insurance or Annuity Contracts
The last major exception to the general rule provides that a husband's
estate may obtain the marital deduction for an interest which passes to
the spouse by way of an insurance or annuity contract.4" This is essen-
tially a "trust" arrangement from which the wife receives income for life
and, she alone must have the power of appointment over the remainder
in all events. The theory underlying this exception is the same as that of
the prior exceptions: the wife has received the entire bundle of property
rights, either directly or by means of a power. Such interests will be tax-
able to her estate upon her demise if the property has not been consumed
or given away during her lifetime.41
LOSS OF DEDUCTION IF INTEREST Is TERMINABLE
Litigation between decedents' personal representatives and the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue concerning the applicability of section
2056(b) to bequests to the surviving wife fall into seven categories. Each
of these categories represents a functional method of transferring property
interests to a survivor. These are: (1) a trust with life income2 to the
36. See generally Reg. 5 20.2056(b)-3 (1958).
37. CODE § 2056(b) (5).
38. In community property states, the surviving spouse owns one-half of the community
property outright. LoWNDEs & KRAmmR, op. cit. supra note 3, at 384.
39. Id. at 398.
40. CODE § 2056(b) (5).
41. Commissioner v. Estate of Ellis, 252 F.2d 109, 112 (3d Cir. 1958).
42. Also, a life estate in the property bequeathed.
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wife and power to consume the corpus; (2) gift over if wife dies before
distribution or administration of the estate; (3) life insurance contracts
payable under optional modes of settlement; (4) life estate with the
power of appointment; (5) widow's allowance for support; (6) dower
rights; and (7) transfer by intestate succession, widow's election, or set-
tlement.
Trusts With Power to Consume Corpus
In Estate of Michael Melamut,43 the testator willed all of hIs estate
to his wife for her use during her life together with a limited power of
invasion for maintenance of her standard of living, remainder over to
the testator's sons. The Tax Court held that where the decedent names
remaindermen to take the unconsumed estate, a mere life tenancy exists
in the wife even though there is a power in the wife to consume all of the
estate during her life. Because such a bequest is a terminable interest,
the marital deduction was disallowed. On the other hand, in Commts-
szoner v Estate of Ellis,44 one half of the estate qualified for the marital
deduction because the wife had a general power of appointment over
that part of the corpus remaining at her death. In Ellis, the estate residue
was bequeathed to a trust. All of the income was bequeathed to the wife
for her life, together with sole power to invade and consume the corpus
during her lifetime. At the widow's death, one half of the remaining
corpus was to go to her estate, the other half to named remaindermen.
However, the portion of the estate over which the widow did not have a
power of appointment was taxable, because under Pennsylvania law the
power to consume was limited. As the widow had no more than a life
estate in the trust, the entire interest did not pass to her and, therefore,
was not entitled to the marital deduction. However, the power of ap-
pointment over a specific portion of the estate did come within the ex-
ception45 to the terminable interest rule.
In Estate of Pipe v Commzsszoner,46 the wife had an unlimited and
uncontrolled power of invasion over the corpus but the power terminated
at her death. By denying to the wife the power of appointment or dispo-
sition through her estate, the husband's estate suffered a $19,000 tax de-
ficiency However, New York law provided that the contingent re-
maindermen could not enforce their rights against the widow during her
life. As a result, the bequest was of the entire fee. Nevertheless, the
federal court refused to follow New York law and held the interest ter-
minable because Mrs. Pipe might fail to consume all of the corpus and
43. 22 T.C. 966 (1954)
44. 252 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1958); see generally Rev. Rul. 54-20, 1954-1 CUM. BULL 195.
45. CODE § 2056(b) (5)
46. 241 F.2d 210 (2d Cir.), cert. donwd, 355 U. S. 418 (1957).
[VoL 16:190
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that interest remaining at her death could pass to another.4 7 The same
result was reached in the sixth circuit case of Piatt v. Gray,4 where the
wife had the power to invade the estate where necessary for her main-
tenance without having to account. The testator named his sister a con-
tingent remainderman. The marital deduction was denied because the
power of appointment was not exercisable in all events.49 Also, where
the trust limits the wife's power of invasion of corpus to amounts for sup-
port of the wife and children, and the trustee was required to keep ac-
counts as to sums expended on each child, the fourth circuit held that the
bequest was a terminable interest because the wife did not have an un-
limited power to appropriate the property."° The court seized on and
construed the requirement for accounting of sums spent on each child
as an advancement to a remainderman, which proved the interest be-
queathed to the spouse was limited to less than the requisite fee interest.
The lesson of these cases is dear: the bequest of a life estate or in-
come for life from a trust together with a power to dispose of the re-
mainder or corpus, which is less than an untrammelled power of appoint-
ment, will fail to qualify for the marital deduction.
Gift Over If Wife Dies Before Dwstributon or Administration
The statute 1 contains another exception to the terminable interest
rule based on a contingency in the will that the wife survive the husband
by a maximum of six months. 2 In the case of Kasper v. Kellar,53 the
husband willed his wife $100,000 and one third of his residuary estate
on the condition she be "alive at time of distribution of his estate." Oth-
erwise, the bequest was to lapse and go over to other named persons.
The question of the time of vesting of such a bequest was held to be con-
trolled by.South Dakota law. As. there were no decisions of the state
47. Id. at 212; see CoDE § 2056(b) (1) (B). In a nontrust bequest situation, where the
wife had the power to "use any part of the principal," the second circuit held that the bequest
was a terminable interest because under New York law it was not a general power of ap-
pointment. The grantee had to respect the rights of-te remaindermen under a good faith
test of invasion of corpus, and she could not make gifts inter vivos of estate property or
exercise a general power of appointment over it. United States v. Lincoln Rochester Trust
Co., 297 F.2d 891 (2d Cir.), cert. daened, 369 U.S. 887 (1962)
48. 321 F.2d 79 (6th Cir. 1963); accord, Estate of Semmes v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 664
(6th Cir. 1961) where under Tennessee state law, a life estate with power to encroach upon
corpus "for her own benefit, at any time.she sees fit" is not equal to a fee interest and does
not qualify for the marital deduction; Estate of Eiwood Comer, 31 T.C. 1193 (1959), where
under Ohio law, invasion for "support, maintenance, and comfort" is a limited power not
qualifying for marital deduction; Rev. Ru. 55-395, 1955-1 Cum. BULL. 458.
49. See CODE § 2056(b) (5); see generally, e.g., Estate of Field, 40 T.C. 802 (1963).
50. Estate of Tarver v. Commissioner, 255 F.2d 913 (4th Cir. 1958).
51. CODE 5 2056.
52. CODE 5 2056(b) (3).
53. 217 F.2d 744 (8th Cir. 1954). On remand from the court of appeals see 138 F. Supp.
738 (D.S.D. 1956). Contra, Rev. Rul. 54-121, 1954-1 CUM. BULL. 196.
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courts on which to resolve the issue, the case was remanded to the federal
district court for a decision based on
unreported trial court decisions, percolating judicial trends, accepted
legal climate, and familiarity with professional thought and temper.54
In Lamar v Bookwalter,5 it was held that where the will required
the wife to survive the administration of the husband's estate, the interest
vested at the testator's death and the marital deduction was accordingly
allowed. On the other hand, in Farrell v United States,56 where survival
of the wife at estate distribution was a condition of transfer, the court held
the bequest to be a terminable interest even though the wife subsequent-
ly survived the distribution. The opposite result in Lamar and Farrell
was difficult to justify.
United States v Mappes,"7 however, is dear authority on survivorship
conditions affecting the marital deduction. In that case, the husband
left the residue of his estate to his wife, but "in the event that my wife
. should die before my estate has been administered I give to
my sons all of the remainder of my property."58  Under Oklahoma
law the bequest was conditioned and did not indefeasibly vest on the day
of testator's death. Rather, it vested instead on the day of entry of the
judicial order directing distribution of the husband's estate. Therefore,
the bequest failed under the terminable interest rule.
Despite the liberal results in the Kasper59 and Lamar" cases, Mappes
represents the strongest authority in the field. To avoid this trap, the
will should follow the statute6' and condition transfer of the marital
bequest on a definite period of survivorship - not more than six months
after the husband's death. An unwarranted hazard lies in using admin-
istration or distribution of estate milestones.
Life Insurance Payable Under Optional Modes of Settlement
The statute 2 permits a marital deduction for an interest passing by
life insurance or annuity contract. The proceeds may be payable in in-
stallments so long as the wife has the sole power to appoint all of the
proceeds inter vivos or by her estate. However, in Meyer v. United
54. 217 F.2d 744, 747-48. On remand, the district court held that the estate vested at the
testator s death, and the six month limitation of CODE § 2056(b) (3) was inapplicable. 138
F. Supp. 738, 744 (D. S.D. 1956); accord, Steele v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 316 (D.
Mont. 1956) (government failed to carry burden of proof state court decree was collusive)
55. 213 F. Supp. 860 (W.D. Mo. 1962), rev'd, 323 F.2d 664 (8th Cir. 1963).
56. 198 F. Supp. 461 (S.D. Cal. 1961)
57 318 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1963).
58. Id. at 510.
59. 217 F.2d 744 (8th Cir. 1954)
60. 213 F. Supp. 860 (W.D. Mo. 1962), rev'd, 323 F.2d 664 (8th Cir. 1963)
61. CODE § 2056(b) (3)
62. CODE § 2056(b) (6)
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States,63 a $25,000 insurance contract provided for payments to the wife
for life, but if she died before receiving monthly payments for twenty
years the insurance company was to make the remaining payments to the
daughter. The insurance company set up two funds: $18,000 to fund
the twenty-year payments and $7200 to fund the post-twenty-year actu-
arial life expectancy of the 42 year-old widow. On the issue of whether
the $7200 should qualify for the marital deduction,"4 the Supreme Court
decided that the insurance policy constituted a single property.- Since it
failed under the terminable interest rule none of the actuarial funds could
be deducted nor did such a funding operation create any severable rights
in the widow. Justice Douglas urged without success65 that the abstract
interest representing the $7200 was deductible because it could neither
fail nor pass to another person.
The Court's strict -application of the statute66 in this insurance case
parallels case developments in the trust and life estate bequest area.
Where the insurance policy allowed minor administrative limitations,
such as 90-day withdrawal intervals and minimum amounts on withdrawal
by the widow, the policy qualified for the marital deductior.as the wife
had the requsite.power of appointment.67  The-rule to. be. gained from
the Meyer'6 case is explicit: the bequest of insurance or annuity proceeds is
analogous to other forms of transfer and such transfer will be strictly
interpreted against deviating estates which do not give the wife complete
ownership. The entire bundle of ownership rights must go to the surviv-
ing spouse to qualify for the marital deduction.
Life Estate With Power of Appointment
The most important exception to the terminable interest rule is the
life estate with a power of appointment in the wife -alone and in all
events. Litigation abounds on the issue of whether, in any case; the hus-
band gave the requisite, unfettered power of appointment. The results
63. 364 U.S. 410 (1960).
64. The $18,000 fund was concededly a terminable interest because it could fail and another
person could succeed to it. Reg. 5 20.2056(b)-6 (1958).
65. Meyer v. United States, 364 U.S. 410 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
66. CoDE S 2056(b) (6); the Court also impliedly overruled In re Estate of Reilly, 239
F.2d 797 (3d Cir. 1957), an almost identical fact situation where the marital deduction was
allowed for a portion of the insurance fund. There the court of appeals relied on the liberal
construction of the Congressional intent to equalize community property treatment of the
federal estate tax. In Meyer v. United States; 364 U.S. 410 (1960), this line of reasoning
was rejected.
67. Estate of Charles R. Jennings, 39 T.C. 417 (1962); cf. Estate of Werbe v. United States,
273 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1959); Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 1029 (1961). 'For a discussion of
whether the Tax Court is required to follow the courts of appeals; see Note, Heresy m the
Hierarchy: Tax Court Rejection. of Court of Appeals Precedents, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 717
(1957).
68. 364 US. 410 (1960).
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from the diverse jurisdictions 9 are bizarre. For example, in the Tax
Court, a deduction was disallowed where the power of appointment was
subject to a proviso that the wife retain her mental capacity,"0 and where
the wife could "do as she pleases" with the estate.7 Similarly, in the
courts of appeals the marital deduction was disallowed where the power
of appointment terminated on the widow's death72 and also where the
widow's power over the estate was limited to selling assets for the purpose
of preventing depreciation.7" In United States v. Lincoln Rochester
Trust Co., 4 the second circuit refused to allow the deduction where the
wife had the power to use any part of the principal of the estate as under
New York law such a bequest is a limited power of invasion conditioned
on good faith use of the principal by the spouse.
On the other hand, the marital deduction was allowed in Gelb v.
Commssioner,5 where a daughter was to be provided for out of the be-
quest to the widow The 1958 Amendment to the statute76 saved this in-
terest from failing since it permitted appointment over only a portion of
the trust or estate. Previously the power had to be over the entire corpus.77
The same result was reached in a liberal decision of the Third' Circuit
Court of Appeals in Hoffman v McGinnes.78 There, the testator gave the
wife the power to consume any or all of the estate as she desired;, "The
court interpreted Pennsylvania law as treating the bequest as a power of
appointment which merged with the life income to give the widow the
fee interest and allowed the deduction. The decision painstimgly distin-
guished the Ellis7" and Pipe'0 decisions which had gone against the tax-
69. In the case of Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35, 45 (1934), the Supreme Court directed
the lower federal courts to follow state property law in deciding federal tax questions. The
circtut courts of appeals have not been in harmony with each other on tax decisions ever since.
Nevitt, Achieving Uniformity Among the 11 Courts of Last Resort, 34 TAXES 311, 312
(1956).
70. Estate of Frank E. Tingley, 22 T.C. 402 (1954), aff'd sub. nom., Starrett v. Commis-
sioner, 223 F.2d 163 (1st Cir. 1955).
71. Estate of William A. I.anders, 38 T.C. 828 (1962)
72. E.g., Estate of Pipe v. Comhilssioner, 241 F.2d 210 (2d'Cir.), cert. denmed, 355 U.S.
814 (1957).
73. Estate of Faulkerson v. United States, 301 F.2d 231 (7th C1r.), cart. denwd, 371 U.S.
887 (1962).
74. 297 F.2d 891 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 887' (1962).
75. 298 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1962)
76. Technical Amendments Act of 1958, 72 Star. 1606, 1668 (1958), CODE.S 2056(b) (5).
The amendment had a retroactive provision covering the years 1948-54.
77 Estate of Arthur Sweet, 24 T.C. 488 (1955), aff'd, 234 F.2d 401 (10th Cir.), cert. de-
ntd, 352 U.S. 878 (1956), where the deduction was denied because the power was over only
a part of the trust, has been legislatively overruled.
78. 277 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1960); Annot., 90 A.L.R.2d 414 (1963).
79. 252 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1958).
80. 241 F.2d 210 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 814 (1957).
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payers.81 In Robertson v. United States,8" the fifth circuit refused to fol-
low the government's argument that a trust with a power of appointment
in the wife failed because no beneficiary could take title to the property
during the administration of the estate. The court held that because the
wife was also an executrix, she had the equivalent of a power of appoint-
ment at all times.
Jointly held property and joint and mutual wills have proven to be
excellent means for avoiding the impact of the terminable interest rule.
In Estate of Awtry v. Commssoner," the husband and wife .had executed
a joint will, but the property passing to the wife consisted of jointly-
owned bank accounts and U. S. Savings Bonds having survivorship fea-
tures. The Commissioner argued that the wife had only a terminable
interest because under the terms of thejoint will the wife, was bound as
to her testamentary disposition of 'the property. The court held, how-
ever, that as the wife had an unlimited power of lifetime disposition of
the property under-Iowa law, the interest passing was deductible despite
the fact that her power of testamentary disposition was foreclosed by the
joint will. "  "
In spite of the liberal trend- of decisions in this area in favor of the
taxpayer, sbstantial deviations from a strict, literal interpretation of the
statute should notrbe taken without recognition of the grave risk.!s
Widow's Allowance for Support
In sympathy with the plight of widows the law has been generous,
both in -making allowances and in exempting them from taxation, by con-
sidering the transfer of a widow's allowance .as a marital bequest. How-
ever, the cases have gone in all directions resolving the question of vest-
ing of title seemingly in reliance on state property law. 6 In Ohio;87
81. Compare Hoffman v. McGinnes, 277 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1960), 'wth CbMnissioner v.
Estate of Ellis, 252 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1958). The facts in each were almost identical, but in
one case the wife waslimited by her "desires"; in the other, by her "requirements." The
results were opposite. Judge Hand'said that courts should not make the dictionary a fortress,'
but here they seem to have done exactly that. See generally Frankfurter, Sdime Reflecttons
on The Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUB& L REV. 527 (1947Y.
82. 310 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1962).
83. 221 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1955); see generally Comment, 55 NW. U. L Riiv, 727 (1961).
84. Accord, Nettz v. Phillips, 202 F. Supp. 270 (S.D. Iowa 1962); Newman v. United.
States, 176 F. Supp. 364 (S.D. IlL 1959); Estate of Vermilya, 41 T.C. 226 (1963).
85. For a skeptical analysis on the predictability of statutory applications see Llewellyn, Re-
krks on the Theory of Appellate Deciston and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are
to Be Construed, 5 VAND. L REv. 395 (1950).
86. See Rev. Rul. 83, 1953-1 C. BULL. 395; see generally Note, 77 HARV. L REV. 533(1964).
87. In re Estate of Croke, 155 Ohio St. 434, 99 N.E.2d 483 (1951)..
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Michigan,8" Illinois,"9 Missouri,9" Maine,9 and Massachusetts 2 the widow's
allowance is afforded the tax shelter of the marital deduction on the
theory that the widow has an indefeasible title in the allowance at her hus-
band's death, whether it can be later lost by her death or remarriage vel
non. However, in California,9" Georgia,94 and Nebraska95 the widow's
allowance is a terminable interest since it does not vest under state law
until the probate court order directs its distribution. The Supreme Court
in Jackson v United States"8 expressly approved taxation of a widow's al-
lowance of $72,000 by a California probate court because, viewing the
situation on the date of the husband's death, the widow had no right to
the allowance. Furthermore, the right terminated under state law if the
widow died during administration or remarried. Moreover, the Court
impliedly disapproved of the allowance as a deduction because of the
obvious abuse at the local level. It is questionable whether $3000 per
month for twenty-four months is required to support any widow. The
Court also noted that Congress had expressly revoked the prior tax ex-
emption for such allowances because of such abuse. 7 In addition, the
Court approved and followed United States v. Qu.ey"8 wherein the allow-
ance was denied deductibility because it was a terminable interest. In
view of the Supreme Court's strong opinion on this issue reliance on the
widow's allowance for tax avoidance is uncertain if more than a modest
amount' is allowed.
Dower Rights
While the importance of dower has declined as a means of trans-
ferring property,' two fifth circuit cases' arising in Alabama have
88. Estate of Procter D. Rensenhouse, 31 T.C. 818 (1959).
89. Molner v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 271 (N.D. 111. 1959).
90. Phelps v. Bookwalter, 210 F. Supp. 801 (W.D. Mo. 1962).
91. Estate of Gale, 35 T.C. 215 (1960).
92. Estate of Rudnick, 36 T.C. 1021 (1960).
93. Jackson v. United States, 376 U.S. 503 (1964); see Second Nat'l Bank v. United States,
222 F. Supp 446 (D. Conn. 1963).
94. United States v. Edmondson, 331 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1964), reversing United States v.
First Nat Bank & Trust, 297 F.2d 312 (Sth Cir. 1961). The fifth circuit decided against
the widow's allowance on the strength of Jackson v. United States, supra note 93.
95. United States v. Quivey, 292 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1961).
96. 376 U.S. 503 (1964).
97. Id. at 505-06; see S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1950).
98. 292 F.2d 252 (8th Cr. 1961).
99. Even though the Ohio Supreme Court vigorously insists on the vested nature of the
allowance under OHIO REv. CODE § 2117.20, the law exhibits a degree of diplopia in placing
exorbitant widow's allowances out of the reach of the federal tax collector and estate creditors,
yet limiting the state inheritance tax exemption to $3000 total. See OHIo REV. CODE 5
5731.03; see generally Bush, Widow's Exemption or Allowance and the Martal Deduatgo,
N.Y.U. 22D INST. ON FED. TAx 1131 (1964).
100. See generally ATKINSON, WILLS § 30, at 107 (2d ed. 1953). The Model Probate
Code recommends abolition of dower. Id. at 109 n.15.
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held that valuable dower rights in lands which the husband owned at Is
death were a deductible non-terminable interest. To reach this conclu-
sion the court employed a novel theory. That is, although common law
dower which Alabama follows was only a life estate in lands which would
terminate on the wife's death, here, it was a commutable chose in action.
Hence, large cash payments to the widow in lieu of dower were deduct-
ible. Consequently, it may constitute a valuable election mode in
states02 which have a substantial dower law."0 3
Transfer by Statutory Election Against the Will
Transfers where the estate of the deceased consort passed to the sur-
viving spouse by intestacy... or through 'an election to take against the
will.. have been held to be a non-terminable interest. Moreover, good
faith settlements in lieu of taking against the will are deductible even
though not the result of an adversary proceeding.0"' The rationale of
such decisions is aligned with the theory of the terminable interest rule.
That is, intestate shares and -outright, transfers of cash settlements vests
the property irrevocably in an estate which -will be taxed on the decease
of the surviving spouse. The foregoing depicts only a portion of the rea-
sons why the election statutes0 7 should be given more consideration in
post-estate planning evaluations in existing terminable interest situations.
STATE LAW MAY NOT CONTROL FEDERAL TAxABIIY
While an objective of federal tax law is uniformity of treatment in
all states, actual practice has proven to be the opposite. The widow's
allowance cases are examples of this in that where state law controls'
vesting, diverge tax results occur in the different states. Judge Mans
made a cogent presentation of the dominance of state property law in
101. United States v. Hiles, 318 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1963); United States v. Crosby, 257
F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1958).
102. 3 VENmR, AmECAN FAmLY LAWS S 189, at 352 (1935).
103. But see, e.g., Estate of Charles Elson, 28 T.C. 442 (1957), where an election by the
spouse under Iowa law to take her dower rights instead of a life estate under a joint and mutual
will was held invalid by the Tax Court. As the court interpreted Iowa law, a surviving party
to a joint and mutual will is bound upon the death of the other party. This rationale is of
questionable validity. See Nettz v. Phillips, 202 F. Supp. 270 (S.D. Iowa 1962).
104. Estate of William A. Landers, 38 T.C. 828 (1962).
105. In re Peters" Will, 88 N.Y.S.2d 142 (Surr. Cr. 1949); Isaac Harter, 39 T.C. 511
(1962); see generally Stevens, Fourteen Years of Marital Deduaction, N.Y.U. 21sr INsr. ON
FED. TAX 257 (1963).
106. Estate of Gertrude P. Barrett, 22 T.C. 606 (1954); see also Indiana Nat'l Bank v.
United States, 191 F. Supp. 73 (S.D. Ind. 1961).
107. E.g., OHIO REv. CODE %5 2107.39 (election to take up to one-half of the net estate
under the statute of descent and distribution); 2117.20 (year's allowance); 2117.24 (one
year's free rent in the mansion house of the deceased consort); and 2115.13 (exempt prop-
erty).
108. Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35 (1934); Rev. Rul. 55-419, 1955-1 Curm. BuLL.
458.
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the area of federal taxation in Gallagher v. Smith."0 9 Three situations are
presented: (1) the federal law creates its own criteria and state law is
inapplicable; (2) either the state decision involves no rule of federal tax
law, or the government was not a party to the action in which case the
state decisions are not binding; and (3) the state decision has concluded
actual property rights in opposition to the intent of Congress which seeks
to impose tax liability, in which event the state court must be followed."'
While the issue of the adversary nature of the state proceeding, or
the lack thereof,"' has controlled many case results, Judge Maris ex-
pounds a better rule:
Whatever may be the case with respect to consent decrees, however, it
is dear that if the question at issue is fairly presented to the state court
for its independent decision and is so decided by the court the result-
ing judgment if binding on the parties under the state law is conclusive
as to their property rights in the federal tax case, regardless of whether
they occupied adversary positions in the state court or were all on the
same side of the questionL12
The more recent decisions exhibit a trend of the federal courts to give
more consideration to state decisions."'
CONCLUSION
The intention of Congress that estates of decedents in common law
states be afforded the same tax advantages as those in community prop-
erty states has- poved to be a weak and unsuccessful foundation for
obtaining the marital deduction in the face of the terminable interest
rule.'i 4.
The application of the terminable interest rule to diverse fact situa-
tions has produced bizarre tax results. In addition, a life estate and a
power of invasion of the corpus of the wife has generally failed" to
qualify for the deduction.
109. 223 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1955).
110. See 1 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE & GiFT TAXATION 1.11 (1942).. Professor Surrey
summed up the situation as follows: "the plan to achieve complete equilization is inherently
incapable of accomplishing its purpose. Estate splitting adopts no such nationwiae urn-
form plan that can operate in essential disregard of, local property rules, or, rather, than can
operate with uniformity regardless of local variations," Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Fam-
ily - The Revenue Act of 1948, 61 HARv, L REv. 1097, 1156-57 (1948).
111. See, e.g., Jackson v. United States, 376 U.S. 503 (1964); Estate of Faulkerson v. United
States, 301 F.2d 231 (7th Cir.), cert. dened, 311 U.S. 887 (1962).
112. Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218, 224-25 (3d Cir. 1955).
113. See, e.g., Nettz v. Phillips, 202 F. Supp. 270 (S.D. Iowa 1962) where the court fol.
lowed Iowa state law in declaring that the wife had a fee interest in property she received by
bequest under a joint and mutual will, in which beneficiaries were named to succeed upon the
decease of the survivor. To the same effect is Newman v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 364
(S.D. IUl. 1959). A crucial point of departure in this trend was the case of Estate of Awtry
v. Commissioner, 221 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1955), reversing 22 T.C. 91 (1954). But see
Estate of Charles Elson, 28 T.C. 442 (1957).
114. See, e.g., Estate of Pipe v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 210, 214 (2d Cir. 1957) (dissent-
ing opinion).
115. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Estate of Ellis, 252 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1958).
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Survivorship for a fixed period after the husband's decease should
conform to the statute and avoid use of indefinite events, such as distri-
bution of the husband's estate.116 Life insurance contracts with the wife
as beneficiary should be carefully drafted to avoid the terminable inter-
est rule as to any portion of the policy which might fail.1
The power of appointment cases11 provide little guidance for future
action. Also, the liberal construction given recently to testamentary pro-
visions indicates a soft line toward minor deviations in the husband's m-
position of restrictions on the power of appointment.
Whether a widow's allowance is deductible is to be decided by refer-
ence to state law. However, the Supreme Court's strong disapproval of
these allowances for tax deduction purposes threatens the continued
efficacy of this device for future transfer of property from the estate of
the husband to the widow without tax liability.119
Dower rights,"so the widow's election, intestate succession, and settle-
ments'. with the deceased's personal representative have all earned the
marital deduction. This raises the question as to whether such actions
might be useful in post-estate planning.
The most astonishing result of recent federal tax litigation is the per-
vading authority of local property law,"m or the court's view thereof,"m
resulting iqhe complete disarray of federal tax deasions.2 4 Application
of state prop~erty law to federal tax questions will undoubtedly prove .to
be a gich lode of future tax litigation.
Continued pressure on estates by the Internal Revenue Service's strict
interpretation of the terminable interest rule is cause for a. reappraisal of
the use of the marital deduction. The marital deduction may be of in-
effective value in reducing estate taxes.
Greater use of income tax provisions, inter vios trusts, insurance,
annuities, tai-free foundations, pension plans, and long-range investment
trusts for children and grandchildren may be advisable in order to pass
more property onto the testator's heirs with a minimum tax unpact.
RUSSELL B. MAMONE
116. United States v. Mappes, 318 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1963).
117. Meyer v. United States, 364 U.S. 410 (1960).,
118. See, e.g., Hoffman v. McGinnes, 277 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1960).; Commissioner v. Estate
of Ellis, 252 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1958).
119. Jacksoanv. United States, 376 U.S. 503 (1964).
120. United States.v. Hiles, 318 F.2d 56.(5th Cir. 1963).
121. See, e.g., Estate of Gertrude P. Barrett, 22 T.C. 606 (1954).
122. See, e.g., Estate of Pipe v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 210 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 814 (1957).
123. Kellar v. Kasper, 138 F. Supp. 738 (D.S.D. 1956).
124. See Comment, Heresy in the Hierarchy: Tax Court Rejection of Couri of Apeai
Precedents, 57 CoLuM. L REV. 717 (1957). "
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